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Abstract—In the recent years, mobile cellular networks are
undergoing fundamental changes and many established concepts
are being revisited. Future 5G network architectures will be
designed to employ a wide range of new and emerging technolo-
gies such as Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network
Functions Virtualization (NFV). These create new virtual network
elements each affecting the logic of the network management
and operation, enabling the creation of new generation services
with substantially higher data rates and lower delays. However,
new security challenges and threats are also introduced. Current
Long-Term Evolution (LTE) networks are not able to accommo-
date these new trends in a secure and reliable way. At the same
time, novel 5G systems have proffered invaluable opportunities
of developing novel solutions for attack prevention, management,
and recovery. In this paper, first we discuss the main security
threats and possible attack vectors in cellular networks. Second,
driven by the emerging next-generation cellular networks, we
discuss the architectural and functional requirements to enable
appropriate levels of security.
Keywords—5G networks; security; software-defined networking;
network function virtualization.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent years we are witnessing a widespread use of
end user devices with advanced capabilities, such as smart-
phones and tablet computers, and the emergence of new
services and communication technologies. Today, a large vari-
ety of Radio Access Technologies (RATs) and heterogeneous
wireless networks have been successfully deployed and used.
Also, the coverage of such wireless and cellular networks has
increased substantially by deploying more Base Stations (BSs)
and Access Points (APs).
It is evident that next-generation cellular networks will ben-
efit from the recent advances in Software Defined Networking
(SDN) [1], [2] and Network Function Virtualization (NFV)
[3], [4]. Traditionally, SDN and NFV, although not dependent
on each other, are seen as closely related and complementary
concepts [5]. This integration enables good scalability in
terms of supporting a large number of connections and heavy
mobility scenarios. Also, the introduction of new services and
applications becomes much easier. Decoupling control and data
planes, and abstracting network functions from the underlying
physical infrastructure, brings much greater flexibility to effi-
ciently utilize radio and computing resources both in the Radio
Access Network (RAN) [6], [7] as well as in the Mobile Core
Network (MCN) [8].
The adoption of aforementioned technologies introduces
new virtual network elements each affecting the logic of the
network management and operation, enabling the creation
of new generation services with substantially higher data
rates and lower delays. However, new security challenges and
threats are also introduced [9]. At the same time, novel next-
generation systems have proffered invaluable opportunities of
developing novel solutions for attack prevention, management
and recovery. As security has always been a concern in
the cellular industry and research communities, there is a
consensus that the security of cellular systems, networks, and
applications has to be studied and tackled adequately.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
present the related work on SDN-based cellular architectures.
In Section III, we describe our considered reference archi-
tecture for next-generation cellular networks, which is based
on SDN and NFV. In Section IV, we discuss some of the
main security threats in cellular networks and identify potential
attack vectors. In Section V, we propose the architectural and
functional enhancements to support security in next-generation
cellular networks. In Section VI, as an example, we describe
the realization of secure content delivery in a virtualized RAN.
We conclude in Section VII. Finally, in Appendix A we present
the list of abbreviations used in the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present the most important, recent works
in the area of next-generation cellular networks security. In
[10], potential security requirements and mechanisms for 5G
networks are discussed. The focus is mainly on the security
aspects of SDN and NFV, and on the differences compared to
the security requirements of traditional Long-Term Evolution
(LTE) networks, such as: confidentiality of user and device
identity; location privacy; entity authentication; signalling data
confidentiality; user data confidentiality; and platform security
requirements.
In [11], the security of 5G wireless transmissions is studied.
The technologies that have been analyzed are: Heterogeneous
Networks (HetNets); Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO)
systems, and millimeter wave wireless communications. In par-
ticular, the focus on physical layer security and the protection
of data confidentiality by exploiting the intrinsic randomness
of the wireless communications medium.
In [12], the security threats and their corresponding coun-
termeasures with respect to the data layer, control layer,
Fig. 1. A Software-Defined Cellular Network Architecture [13].
application layer, and communication protocols of SDN-based
cellular network are explored. Various security threats are
classified and the open security challenges are discussed in
the context of SDN-based cellular networks.
The aforementioned works show that there is a need to
consider the existing security threats as well as to prevent
any new threats and risks that could arise. Our current work
tries to contribute towards these efforts. In this paper, first we
discuss the main security threats and possible attack vectors
in cellular networks. Second, driven by the emerging next-
generation cellular networks, we discuss the architectural and
functional requirements to enable appropriate levels of security.
III. A SOFTWARE-DEFINED CELLULAR NETWORK
ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we present our considered reference archi-
tecture for software-defined next-generation cellular networks
[13]. This architecture has benefited from the recent advances
in SDN and NFV technologies. Below, we describe the RAN
and the MCN of the reference architecture (see also Fig. 1).
A. Radio Access Network (RAN)
The RAN consists of Small-cell BSs (SBSs), Macro-cell
BSs (MBSs), WiFi APs, Local Offload Gateways (LO-GWs),
and MUs. These are coordinated by the Local SDN Controller
(LSC). The RAN is divided into clusters, with each cluster
covering one or more macro cells and being controlled by a
dedicated LSC. The notion of clusters is similar to the notion
of Tracking Areas (TAs) in LTE networks. For simplicity, in
Fig. 1 each one of the two LSCs controls a cluster covering
only a single marco cell.
A LSC is responsible for receiving connection requests
from its cluster and for allocating appropriate destination
address. This is performed by the Local Request Resolution
Function (LRRF). In particular, the LRRF will facilitate the
connection establishment either with an in-cluster entity (MU,
SBS, etc.) or will forward the request to the MCN. Hence,
the LRRF is aware of the network topology within the cluster
and of egress nodes connections towards the MCN and other
clusters. The LRRF can also achieve load-balancing and other
optimization objectives [14].
Other functions of a LSC include the Multi-RAT Coor-
dination Function (MRCF) and the Local Content Caching
Function (LCCF). The MRCF is responsible for allocating
radio resources in geographical areas where more than one
RAT is available. It can be seen as the Access Network
Discovery and Selection Function (ANDSF) [15], enhanced
with traffic offloading capabilities, using schemes such as the
Selected IP Traffic Offload (SIPTO) or the Local IP Access
(LIPA) [16].
The LCCF observes content requests from in-cluster MUs
and keeps track of the localized content popularity. Based on
that and on the knowledge of available storage resources in
the cluster, the LCCF is responsible for caching decisions
within the cluster. Most of caching solutions exploit the fact
that the popularity distribution of content objects follows the
Zipf-Mandelbrot distribution [17]. This means that even by
allocating relatively small storage space, high cache hit ratio
can be achieved [18]. This can greatly reduce the content
access delay and the traffic going via the MCN [19].
Local routing decisions are performed by the Local Content
Routing Function (LCRF). The LCRF receives requests from
the LRRF to construct the content delivery path to a local
source. Then it configures the Flow Tables at the data plane
forwarding elements. A LSC is also responsible for steering the
Device-to-Device (D2D) communication via the Device Con-
trol Function (DCF). This can be achieved using technologies
such as LTE Direct [20], WiFi, or Bluetooth for data transfer
between MUs, while the control channels to/from the BS
may use licensed spectrum [21]. Furthermore, by co-designing
the LCRF with the LCCF, joint optimisation of caching and
routing logic can be achieved [22].
Finally, a LCS is handling the in-cluster mobility via
the Local Mobility Management Function (LMMF). Hence,
this information is not passed to the MCN, which greatly
reduces the processing and signalling overhead, due to reduced
paging messages [23]. This also enables native and elegant
incorporation of distributed mobility management schemes
[24]. Furthermore, SDN-assisted mobility management can
efficiently support even fast moving users/vehicles assuring
acceptable Quality-of-Experience (QoE) [25].
B. Mobile Core Network (MCN)
The MCN consists of a distributed set of Core SDN
Controllers (CSCs), Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) infras-
tructure, Mobile Content Delivery Network (M-CDN) servers,
Packet Data Network Gateways (P-GWs), and Serving Gate-
ways (S-GWs). A CSC is responsible for receiving and han-
dling connection requests from a set of dedicated clusters,
performed by the Core Content Resolution Function (CCRF),
and for carrying out the mobility management, via the Core
Mobility Management Function (CMMF).
Management of storage (i.e., M-CDN or in-network
caches), computing (i.e., MCC), spectrum, and energy re-
sources, as well as QoE support, is performed by the Resource
Management Function (RMF). RMF’s decisions on the alloca-
tion of (both physical and virtualised) resources are based on
a number of factors, such as current demand and consumption,
monitored radio network conditions, MU density and mobility
patterns. To support energy-efficient operation, the RMF is
responsible for moving the virtualized resources away from
heavily underutilized clusters and for switching some of the
equipment off. This enables energy savings during off-peak
hours. The role of a P-GW and a S-GW is similar to the role of
homonymous entities in LTE networks, but is restricted to data
plane only. The corresponding control plane functionality is
performed by a CSC (in accordance with the SDN concept). In
particular, a P-GW is used to access the external IP networks,
whereas a S-GW is used to access the RAN.
IV. SECURITY THREATS AND ATTACK VECTORS
Below we discuss some of the main security threats in
cellular networks and identify potential security attack vectors.
In particular, we discuss the Denial of Service (DoS), Privacy
Violation Attacks (PVA), Location Spoofing Attacks (LoSA),
Operations, Administration and Management Traffic Spoofing
Attacks (OAM-TSA), and Physical Tampering Attacks (PTA).
A. Denial of Service (DoS)
DoS attacks nowadays constitute a serious problem as more
and more websites and companies are targets of such attacks.
On the other hand, it is very hard to ensure appropriate levels
of protection against them [26]. DoS is a significant threat
mainly when the access to the MCN from BSs is done over
untrusted networks (e.g., the Internet). Regarding the issue of
DoS attacks that originate from the RAN side, this is generally
considered as a low threat. The reason is that the traffic
from BSs towards the MCN consists mainly of data traffic
originating from MUs and management traffic originating from
BSs. This traffic is generally considered very small to cause
serious DoS.
B. Privacy Violation Attacks (PVA)
The privacy of MUs is a very important and sensitive
topic. It has especially gained attention due to recently re-
ported privacy violations and concerns from mobile network
operators as well as the MUs. It is important to develop
appropriate trust models and privacy policies to that the cellular
infrastructure and communication channels can be trusted by
the subscribers [27]. Regarding the radio communication part
(channels between MUs and BSs), the interfaces according to
3GPP standards generally hide the MU identity information
[28]. Also, to secure the backhaul (channels between BSs
and MCN), IPSec tunneling is used to transfer the traffic.
This aims, among others, at securing MU identities against
eavesdroppers, contrary to what happens in open backhaul
networks, such as the Internet.
C. Location Spoofing Attacks (LoSA)
Location verification is another important aspect that
mainly concerns the SBSs. The aim is to ensure that the SBSs
are deployed only in authorized locations, so that deployment
of bogus SBSs is prevented. A LoSA tries to make the MCN
believe that the SBS resides at locations different than its real
physical locations. To address this issue, Global Positioning
System (GPS) tracking and “sniffing” the cellular network
environment can be used to verify and confirm the SBS
location. However, even these measures are sometimes not
sufficient and more sophisticated protection techniques need
to be developed [29].
D. Operations, Administration and Management Traffic Spoof-
ing Attacks (OAM-TSA)
An attacker may try to spoof the OAM traffic to disrupt
the normal operation of the cellular network. To avoid this,
OAM traffic from BSs must be encrypted and transported via
an IPSec tunnel. This makes it harder for an attacker to spoof
it from an untrusted backhaul network or from the BS itself.
However, there could also be other threats. For example, there
would be a possibility of insider attacks on the path from the
S-GW to OAM [30].
E. Physical Tampering Attacks (PTA)
Although security is a critical aspect of any wireless
communication system, the case of dense small cell deploy-
ments needs particular attention. SBSs can be easy targets of
various security attacks if no adequate security measures are
taken [31]. This is further complicated by the requirement
for automated configuration of residential SBSs. That is,
the customers expect they simply plug the SBS into their
broadband connection and allow it to configure itself and join
the cellular network. Hence, an important security requirement
is the mutual authentication of the SBS and the rest of the
cellular network. It is also expected that once the SBS joins
the network it can be fully controlled by the network operator.
Hence, to prevent a PTA by a malicious customer, the SBSs
must be protected by a variety of mechanical and electronic
techniques.
V. SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Having identified the main security threats and potential
security attack vectors in Section IV, in this section we propose
the required architectural and functional enhancements for the
reference architecture presented in Section III. In particular, we
introduce the Security Gateway (SeGW), the IPsec tunnelling
and the Security Policy Manager (SPM), and discuss the
required security enhancements of the Home Subscriber Server
(HSS) and the Element Management System (EMS).
A. Security Gateway (SeGW)
As suggested by the 3GPP, when the access to the MCN
from BSs is done over untrusted networks (e.g., the Internet),
the protection can be provided by a SeGW. A typical SeGW
has mechanisms to protect against DoS attacks from the public
Internet. A SeGW can be placed at the edge of the MCN to
secure traffic to/from the RAN. The reason is that the backhaul
Fig. 2. Security Architecture.
network may be insecure. Hence, the SeGW will enable
communication via secure tunnels to protect the information
transmitted over the backhaul network. As shown in Fig. 2,
SeGW participates both in the control plane and data plane.
Before establishing the secure tunnel, the SeGW performs a
mutual authentication with the LSC for control traffic and
with the BS for data traffic. If and only if the authentication
is successful, the incoming traffic will be allowed to the
MCN. That is, to ensure secure operation, the SeGW must use
certificates to perform mutual authentication with the LSC and
the BS. The SeGW will filter out any received unauthenticated
traffic.
B. IPsec Tunneling
For secure tunnelling between the MCN and the RAN,
the IPsec protocol can be used [32]. To establish the IPsec
tunnel, the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) v2 authentication
protocol [33] may be used as specified in [34]. The IKEv2
configuration payload is used to provide the BS with an inner
IP address, which is then used in IPsec tunnel mode operations
for communication with the SeGW. The SeGW can check the
status of the supplied certificate using a Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) [35] or the Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OSCP) [36]. Finally, to provide integrity, confidentiality, and
replay protection for data in the IPsec tunnel, the Encapsulated
Security Payload (ESP) protocol may be used [37].
C. Security Policy Manager (SPM)
To configure and enforce security policies, SPM has been
introduced. This function, is part of a CSC and configures
the RAN infrastructure according to specified policies, in-
stalls/upgrades the protection and performs location verifica-
tion of untrusted equipment, such as a SBS. Since the SPM
has been placed behind the SeGW, no transport layer security
is required. Otherwise, this connection must be secured, e.g.,
via the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [38].
D. Home Subscriber Server (HSS)
For holding the subscription data and authentication infor-
mation for MUs, a HSS can be used. In addition to its usual
functionality, the HSS can also be used for enforcing a more
fine grained access control. For example, it may restrict MU
access to specific parts of the cellular network or to specific
insecure equipment.
Fig. 3. Virtualized Radio Access Network.
E. Element Management System (EMS)
To secure the communication of the EMS with the BS via
an untrusted network, certificate-based mutual authentication
must be performed. For this purpose, the TLS protocol can be
used. Alternatively, the EMS and the BS could communicate
via the SeGW. In this case, the communication between the
BS and the SeGW can be secured via the IPsec and the ESP.
VI. SECURE CONTENT DELIVERY IN VIRTUALISED RAN
In this section, we describe the realization of secure content
delivery in a virtualised RAN. To enable efficient and smooth
collaboration of LSCs within the RAN and with the MCN,
NFV technology is used. NFV decouples the network functions
from the underlying hardware, thus making these functions
virtualized by allowing them to be migrated and instantiated
on demand. This is realized via Virtual Machines (VMs),
using tools like VMware [39] or VirtualBox [40]. Furthermore,
low-cost and low-demand virtualization technologies, such
as unikernels [41], enable migrating network functions and
services even to MUs.
In Fig. 3, a model for a virtualized RAN using SDN and
NFV is shown. A number of VMs, running on the same
physical infrastructure, enable virtualized implementation of
BSs via the available NFV Infrastructure (NFVI). As shown,
LSC controls each virtual BS, within the corresponding cluster,
via a dedicated Local SDN Agent (LSA). LSC has also been
enhanced with the Authentication Server (AuS), which has the
responsibility to authenticate all traffic coming from cluster
BSs. Furthermore, each virtual BS is equipped with a Virtual
Firewall (vFW) that can be used to control incoming and
outgoing traffic according to specified security rules.
As an example, consider the virtualized content routing
function that routes traffic between two BSs, as shown in Fig.
4. In this example, Bob wants to receive a content object from
Alice. Let us assume that the request resolution has already
taken place (via the LRRF) and the LSC knows that the content
source is Alice. Let us also assume that Alice has been notified
Fig. 4. Realization of Secure Local Content Routing Function.
about the content request. Initially, Alice will send the content
to its attached BS. Next, the corresponding BS will send the
authentication request message to the LSC. This message will
be passed to the AuS. After that, the BS will receive the
authentication response message. If the authentication attempt
is successful, the LCRF will be informed to construct the
delivery path and to configure the Flow Tables along the path
by sending route configuration messages. After that, when the
data plane forwarding entities (i.e., the two BSs) receive the
requested content, they forward it to next hop according to the
Flow Table.
Finally, to realize a secure inter-LSC communication, the
IPsec protocol can be used. Neighboring LSCs may exchange
information using X2 interfaces. In case the physical security
of the involved LSCs is not assured, then the link can be
secured using IPsec and ESP tunneling. The mutual authenti-
cation and authorization can be based on IKEv2. After that, a
secured IPsec link is established between the two LSCs.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first discuss the main security threats and
potential attack vectors in a cellular network. Second, based
on a reference software-defined cellular network architecture,
we propose the required architectural and functional enhance-
ments. In particular, we introduce the Security Gateway, the
IPsec tunneling and the Security Policy Manager, and discuss
the required security enhancements of the Home Subscriber
Server and the Element Management System. Finally, we de-
scribe the realization of secure content delivery in a virtualized
RAN. To achieve that, the Authentication Server and Virtual
Firewalls have been introduced at the RAN level.
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ANDSF Access Network Discovery and Selection Function
AP Access Point
AuS Authentication Server
BS Base Station
CCRF Core Content Resolution Function
CMMF Core Mobility Management Function
CRL Certificate Revocation List
CSC Core SDN Controller
D2D Device-to-Device
DCF Device Control Function
DoS Denial of Service
EMS Element Management System
ESP Encapsulated Security Payload
GPS Global Positioning System
HetNet Heterogeneous Network
HSS Home Subscriber Server
IKE Internet Key Exchange
LCCF Local Content Caching Function
LCRF Local Content Routing Function
LIPA Local IP Access
LMMF Local Mobility Management Function
LO-GW Local Offload Gateway
LRRF Local Request Resolution Function
LSA Local SDN Agent
LoSA Location Spoofing Attack
LSC Local SDN Controller
LTE Long-Term Evolution
MBS Macro-cell BS
MCC Mobile Cloud Computing
M-CDN Mobile Content Delivery Network
MCN Mobile Core Network
MIMO Multiple-Input Multiple-Output
MRCF Multi-RAT Coordination Function
MU Mobile User
NFV Network Function Virtualisation
OAM Operations, Administration and Management
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
P-GW Packet Data Network Gateway
PTA Physical Tampering Attack
PVA Privacy Violation Attack
QoE Quality-of-Experience
RAN Radio Access Network
RAT Radio Access Technology
RMF Resource Management Function
SBS Small-cell BS
SDN Software-Defined Networking
S-GW Serving Gateway
SeGW Security Gateway
SIPTO Selected IP Traffic Offload
SPM Security Policy Manager
TA Tracking Area
TLS Transport Layer Security
TSA Traffic Spoofing Attack
vFW Virtual Firewall
VM Virtual Machine
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